The 'death of evidence' issue in Canada raises the specter of politicized science, and thus terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, which is also motivated by issues pertaining to scientific explanation.
4 Goldenberg (2015) argues that also values are based on and in this sense embody empirical evidence. In what follows, I will contribute to general philosophical discussions on science and values. While many prior accounts make some room for social values while showing how this avoids politicized science, I shall argue for a stronger role for social values. 4 Upon reviewing some previous accounts of the role of values, in Section 3 I criticize the strategy of allocating different values to different steps of research, which has also been used by many sympathetic to social values in an attempt to provide a clear-cut distinction between the licit use of a value (in a certain research step) and illicit politicized science. The most convincing position for values in the context of theory acceptance has been the idea that social values can influence the evidential threshold. This argument from inductive risk maintains that we should demand more evidence (before hypothesis acceptance) if accepting an actually false hypothesis would have severe social and other practical consequences (e.g., Douglas 2009 ). However, such accounts have the consequence that when evidence increases (and thus any given evidential threshold is met) the impact of social values converges to zero. Using the case of past accounts of human evolution and primate social behaviour-which were both empirically flawed and sexist-in Section 4 I suggest that not only epistemic considerations, but also social and environmental values may determine a scientific theory's conditions of adequacy. Various considerations can be used by scientists to judge the adequacy of a theory, depending on the particular case, but in our context this includes what it means for the theory to be unbiased and complete. The role of conditions of adequacy is not diminished at all by evidence accumulating, so that my central aim is to argue for a stronger role for social values in the context of theory acceptance. This position is clarified and defended in Section 5, where I point out that my account cannot be captured by prior approaches that conceptualize theory acceptance solely in terms of making inferences from evidence, sketching a broader framework by creating Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories 5 connections to philosophical discussions of scientific explanation (which motivate and support my perspective, even though they did not engage with social values). The concluding section returns to the worry about politicized science.
Inductive risk and other prior accounts of the role of values
Philosophical discussions of the relation between science and values have gained prominence during the last two decades (Barker and Kitcher 2013; Douglas 2009; Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007; Kitcher 2001; Lacey 1999; Longino 1990; Machamer and Wolters 2004) . Furthermore, viewing science as including social values and being answerable to society has recently been complemented by a new vision of philosophy's aims, in terms of a socially relevant and socially engaged philosophy of science (Plaisance and Fehr 2010 ; see also Kourany 2010, ch. 5) . 5 There are still some who uphold the ideal of 'value-free' science, but even a restrictive position does not deny that values can play a legitimate role in science. Rather, the strategy is first to distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values (McMullin 1983; Dorato 2004; Douglas 2000; Rooney 1992 )-the terminology of cognitive as opposed to non-cognitive values is likewise used (Laudan 1984; Lacey 2004) . 6 While ethical, social, and environmental values are non-epistemic, epistemic values include a theory's internal consistency, its fit with evidence, its consistency with other theories, its predictive accuracy, its generality and unifying power, and its simplicity. It is uncontroversial that many, if not all of these epistemic values are rightly used by scientists. Second, different steps of scientific research are distinguished, for instance research project choice, hypothesis acceptance, and knowledge application (Douglas 2000) . Everyone has to acknowledge that even non-epistemic values may be used in the choice of a research project and the technological application of knowledge, for example, scientists may study the effects of climate change on biodiversity because of an environmentalist agenda. Consequently, those who
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6 maintain that science ought to be 'value-free' distinguish different research steps so as to focus on the core step of science-accepting hypotheses by evidence-and maintain that in this context of theory acceptance, only epistemic values may be used.
But even excluding social values from theory acceptance would not undermine the philosophical need to study such values, given that other aspects of scientific research raise epistemological questions and have social impacts. The 'death of evidence' issue in Canada vividly highlights the societal effect of choosing certain lines of research (or not being able to do so due to selective underfunding), and of communicating and applying scientific knowledge (or being prevented from communicating results). Against the idea of a global aim of science, Philip Kitcher (2001, ch. 6 ) has argued that scientific aims are particular aims arising locally in a discipline, where their scientific significance often combines intellectual and practical, application related considerations. Going beyond this, Janet Kourany (2010, ch. 5 ) stresses the importance of critically-based on social values-evaluating the research problems scientists work on and the application of their results, and argues that philosophers of science should devote more of their work to these research steps. How even the choice of research projects can be philosophically scrutinized involving a combination epistemic and ethical-social considerations can be illustrated by Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann's (2011) investigation of the development of HPV vaccines. Current virus-like-particle vaccines are expensive to produce, have to be stored using refrigeration, and are effective only when three doses are administered over a 6 month period. As result, the available vaccines will not benefit people in developing countries, who are most in need of HPV prevention. (Brown 2013; Rottschaefer 2003) . One is the argument from underdetermination. Sometimes it is phrased in terms of auxiliary hypotheses (Anderson 2004; Campbell 1994 Campbell , 1998 Intemann 2001) . Starting with the assertion that a theory cannot be tested in isolation and has testable consequences only once combined with an auxiliary hypothesis, the observation is that there are actual cases where the auxiliary hypothesis used embodies social values or that scientists' preference for using this auxiliary hypothesis was based in part on social values. Moreover, different auxiliary hypotheses could be used (resulting in a different outcome for the theory to be tested), and since empirical considerations alone cannot settle which auxiliary hypothesis is to be chosen, there is nothing to rationally prevent one from choosing a theory because it aligns with one's social values. The latter idea is often directly phrased in terms of underdetermination (Intemann 2005; Longino 1990 Longino , 2002 Psillos 2015) . The argument is that a theory is always underdetermined by evidence alone, so that additional considerations are needed to fill the gap between evidence and theory. Values, including social values, are not only an unavoidable, but also fruitful way to achieve theory choice. In the remainder of my discussion, I focus on the other type of argument for social values in the context of theory acceptance, given that it is often seen to be the more convincing one.
The argument from inductive risk stems from Richard Rudner's (1953) seminal account, according to which ethical and other non-epistemic values may influence the amount of evidence that is deemed to be sufficient for accepting a hypothesis. Using Hempel's (1965) terminology, this approach is nowadays typically discussed under the label of inductive risk (Douglas 2000; Elliott 2011b; Steel 2010 Steel , 2013 , given that evidential support for an empirical theory is always
Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories 8 inductive, and given that accepting even a very well-supported theory is a risk, as it could still turn out to be false. But accepting and acting on a hypothesis that is actually false may have bad social and other practical consequences, for instance, approving a new drug on the erroneous assumption that it has no serious side-effects. Thus, the more severe the consequences of endorsing a false hypothesis would be-by the light of social and other ethical values-the more evidence is needed before this hypothesis can be accepted. In line with this, Kitcher (1985) emphasized that the standards for sociobiological explanations claiming human social behaviours, e.g., racism or social hierarchies, to be evolutionary adaptations ought to be at least as high as the evidential standards used in evolutionary accounts of animal behaviour (and then offered an empirical argument that often the stark opposite was the case).
Heather Douglas (2009) a safeguard against a politicized science, which is not strictly committed to scientific objectivity but would endorse theories merely because they align with a political agenda:
In the cases of politicized science, the norm against a direct role for values in the decisions about empirical claims is violated. … The conceptual structure I have described in this chapter thus allows for a clear distinction between value-laden and politicized science. (Douglas 2009, 113) While there is nothing wrong with distinguishing different aspects or steps of research, I
argue that there are limits to the philosophical strategy of segregating different research steps with the aim of being able to adjudicate whether a particular value was licitly (or illicitly) used by looking at this one step. One basic reason is that the actual outcome of research, e.g., a journal article endorsing a hypothesis, requires a sequence of several steps, so that a critical evaluation of this research-be it on epistemic or on social grounds-sometimes cannot assign blame to an individual research step regardless of the outcome it only yields in combination with other steps.
A good example is the well-known fact that drug trials sponsored by the companies producing the drug are more likely to find it effective and without serious side-effects than independent studies (Lundh et al. 2012 ). Something wrong is going on here, but it is usually not the case that the authors would falsify data or use shoddy statistical methods-the papers pass rigorous peerreview precisely because they follow standard epistemic procedures. The explanation for the bias is that industry-sponsored trials know to 'ask the right questions' (Smith 2005) , e.g., having the trial drug run against too low a dose of a competitor drug (making the trial drug seem more effective) or against too high a dose of a competitor drug (making the trial drug's side-effects appear relatively minor).
This asking of particular questions to get a more favourable outcome does indeed belong to the step of research question selection or the step of experimental methodology selection (which of these steps, or both?). But there is nothing intrinsically wrong about asking such a question, e.g., comparing the drug against a particular competitor drug with a certain dosage.
What is first and foremost problematic is the impact that the published results would have, where The pursuit of this dual social aim 'affects not only research questions but also … such aspects of research as concepts (e.g., the concept of "partner violence" itself); measurement scales and techniques; methods of subject selection; strategies of data collection, analysis, and interpretation; and even methods of publishing and disseminating results' (Kourany 2010, 72) . In particular, it requires broadening the definition of 'partner violence' to include emotional and sexual in addition to physical abuse and to change the measuring of sexual violence by taking its context into account.
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This suggests the second reason for why one cannot base one's account of the role of values on a separate treatment of steps of research. Scientists' use of particular definitions, categories, and concepts impacts all aspects of research. And sometimes a category (e.g., 'partner violence') embodies value-judgments, or more precisely, its scientific use leads to an effect that is more problematic than an alternative definition would have. 12 An example that goes beyond social science is climate change research (Schienke et al. 2011) . Climate management models may use the concept of 'utility' as a measure of global wealth, which is to be maximized 
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Not all direct roles for values in these early stages of science should be acceptable, however.
One cannot use values to direct the selection of a problem and a formulation of a methodology that in combination predetermines (or substantially restricts) the outcome of a study. (Douglas 2009, 100) However, this admission qualifies her basic idea that values may be used in a direct role in the context of research problem choice-without offering an account of the conditions in which the direct role is illicit. Given that one would have to look at a context larger than research problem choice, such an account would go beyond Douglas's philosophical distinction between direct and indirect roles. 13 That said, I do not recommend a solution in terms of restricting the general influence of values even further. In contrast to any philosophical account segregating steps of research, there may be no general articulation of the role of social values-at least one which considers research steps in isolation-ensuring a clear boundary that prevents the use of values to lead to an improperly commercialized or politicized science. But this situation is unlikely to be specific to social values, in that sometimes the problematic use of an epistemic value or method can only be criticized based on a consideration of the overall process of research. role, more evidential reasons in support of a choice undercut the potency of the value consideration, as uncertainty is reduced. (Douglas 2009, 96-97) This shows that Douglas fully endorses this diminishment of the role of social values, as it excludes a politicized science where values would function as evidence (Douglas 2009, 113 & 122 Past theoretical accounts of human evolution and archaeological field studies had an androcentric bias toward men's innovations (Schiebinger 1999; Wylie and Hankinson Nelson 2007; Zihlman 1997 ). This was aggravated by some approaches trying to pinpoint a particular cognitive, behavioural, or technological innovation that was especially instrumental in making our ancestors modern humans. Dominant until the 1960s, the man-the-hunter account assumed that hunting furthered the development of bipedalism, an enlarged brain, and tool use. It featured hunting, especially big-game hunting, as an activity of men, which as a socially coordinated activity required new cognitive abilities. This overall vision was qualified by the addition of the woman-the-gatherer account, which saw women not just as passive in human evolution, but contributing to subsistence and the development of tools required for gathering. It was shown that for the majority of our ancestors most of the caloric intake did not come from big-game hunting, where women are likely to have provided more overall food by weight than men.
Toward a role for social values beyond setting the evidential threshold
While initially the archeological record about even stereotypically female activities was largely ignored, sometimes rationalized by the assumption that women's activities are archeologically largely inaccessible due to their more perishable artefacts (unlike stone tools), nowadays the role of gender and the specific contributions of women has become an important dimension of investigation. Even the woman-the-gatherer account has come to be seen as stereotyping gender roles as well as being empirically inadequate. This has led to the reinterpretation of previous data. For instance, pestles and other tools had originally been interpreted as indicating female household activity in many cases of being found with a woman, yet as evidence of men manufacturing such tools when the same kind of tool was found with a man. Novel kinds of data has also been made possible by the new perspective, such as the search for traces of more perishable artefacts, or analyses of bone breakage patterns and stone tool wear patterns, which provide evidence of secondary processing (after hunting and butchering), and thus sophisticated tool use involving women.
A similar situation was to be found in accounts of non-human primate social behaviour (Hrdy 1981 (Hrdy , 1986 Schiebinger 1999; Strum and Fedigan 1999, 2000) . Early studies happened to devote more observational and theoretical attention to the activities of male primates. Individuals were categorizes as dominant males, peripheral males, and females / young, so to the extent that the social role of female primates was investigated, it often boiled down to reproduction and rearing offspring. Indeed, even if the scope of research is not overall social behaviour but more specifically sexual behaviour, female sexuality cannot be restricted to reproductive sex, as philosopher Elizabeth Lloyd (1993 Lloyd ( , 2005 has argued. She points to studies who run afoul of this by observing male-female sex only or more explicitly considering female behaviour as sexual only if it is reproductive, 15 even though it is known that in many primate species females engage in sexual activities outside the estrus (and thus independently of reproduction) and in bonobos among others there are widespread female-female sexual interactions.
The observational focus of early primatology led to accounts that were similarly androcentric as past theories of human evolution, in that they entailed more active behaviours and a more influential social role for male primates, while females were initially seen as being noncompetitive and submissive, trading sex for food and protection. Observations and theoretical interpretations were also guided by the theory of sexual selection. Introduced by Darwin, sexual selection maintains that in animals it is the males that compete among each other (for access to females), while a female chooses a suitable male, which has led to the stereotype of the promiscuous male primate and the 'coy' female primate. This bias started to be remedied only when a larger proportion of female researchers entered primatology (Small 1984 In the article on which I relied above, Anderson (1995) sets up her discussion by criticizing a 10-step argument for the idea that values cannot play a role in the justification of theories, which she broadly ascribes to Susan Haack (1993) . (See also Haack 1996, which shows that Haack's concern is to prevent politicized science.) The first two steps are most relevant for my purposes, so I restate only them:
1. Significant truth is the sole aim of theoretical inquiry.
Whether a theory is justified depends only on features indicative of its truth, not its
significance. (Anderson 1995, 33; emphasis added) This aligns with an idea we have already encountered, the traditional tenet that while considerations of significance-including social relevance-may well be used when choosing research problems, in the context of theory acceptance only fit with evidence matters, but significance does not. But philosophical accounts of scientific explanation-and thus considerations independently of social values-already show premise 2 to be flawed. It is wellknown that not every true representation qualifies as an explanation (Craver 2007 In the case of a theory of human evolution or primate social behaviour, among other things the conditions of adequacy stipulate that to be complete, the theory include the social contributions of women (to the extent that they impact human evolution) or the social role of female primates-both the social influence that aligns with men's / male primate's and that is distinctive to women / female primates. Some may grant that past theories in these domains were indeed inadequate, while arguing that social values are not implicated given that the theories were inadequate with respect to purely epistemic considerations, e.g., the capturing of all explanatorily relevant social activities. One problem with this construal is that it does not quite
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24 align with the considerations of some of the scientists involved. While several of the for the most part female biologists who criticized and rectified past accounts denied to have employed an explicit feminist agenda and in some cases may not even have identified using the label 'feminist,' it is clear that at the very least an implicit gender-sensitivity has played a role in their theoretical reflections (Fedigan 1997; Kourany 2010; Schiebinger 1999; Strum and Fedigan 1999) . The same holds for past work in archaeology (Conkey and Gero 1997; Conkey and Spector 1984; Hanen and Kelley 1992; Wylie and Hankinson Nelson 2007) .
But regardless of what values motivated (some) scientists in the past, these scientific accounts can and should be scrutinized also based on such social values as gender equity. I indeed claim that the very value of gender equity is relevant. For my account distinguishes between conditions of adequacy, which are scientific standards to be met by a theory (e.g., 'include the social role of females'), and the values and other considerations that guide the formulation of adequacy conditions. In this particular scientific case, the value of gender equity does not entail that the same social roles or sex-related behaviours are to be ascribed to males and females, but that the social contributions of females (be they similar or different from males') are to be captured by the theory.
One possible reason for this is that gender-biased and empirically flawed accounts of human evolution-and even of non-human primate sociality-can make current human gender stereotypes or inequities seem to reflect a general natural reality. This would justify adequacy conditions based on the social consequences that the promotion of an inadequate theory would have, analogous to how inductive risk accounts appeal to the consequences of endorsing a false theory (although I have indicated that there is more is to be considered than the falsity of scientific representations There the focus was on how a value underlying research question choice can sometimes be seen to be problematic only once its effect on other research steps, including theory acceptance, are considered. Now my point is that value considerations in the steps of research question and methodology choice are grounded by the theory's scientific purpose and the theory's conditions of adequacy, and in this sense the context of theory acceptance. Thereby the notions of a theory's purpose and its adequacy conditions, which my framework invokes, have an impact across various aspects of research. In our primatology case, gathering a diversity of evidence so as to be mindful of gender variation and androcentric bias is indeed a desideratum for observational methodology, but the underlying values stem from the theory's purpose. In any case, even if the social values are also operative in the early steps of research, the conditions of adequacy-based in part on these values-must always be met in theory acceptance.
My account also shows why social values make a positive contribution, rather than it being sufficient to remove problematic social values, such as androcentrism (see also Helen Longino (1996) has prominently scrutinized the dichotomy between epistemic and non-epistemic values (see also Longino 1995) . On her account, in a situation where established biological theories actually have a sexist bias, using the epistemic value of consistency with other theories will work against the acceptance of new, non-sexist accounts, so that in this context this epistemic value also has a social valence. Conversely, values that are social or at least were proposed by feminist discussions of science, e.g., 'novelty' (significantly differing from current theories), 'ontological heterogeneity,' and 'mutuality of interaction,' can in certain contexts further the endorsement of theories that are empirically more adequate. I likewise do not are specific standards that a particular theory has to meet.
Some may object that given that different values may legitimately be brought to bear on a theory, there are cases where my account has the implication that the theory is adequate (relative to one set of values) but at the same time inadequate (relative to other values). Note that something similar already obtains in the case of the widely accepted inductive risk accounts,
given that a theory may meet one evidential threshold (that stems from only certain practical consequences of erroneously accepting the theory being deemed to be socially problematic) but not another evidential threshold (stemming from a different ethical judgement about the various consequences of acting on a false theory). But my response to the objection is bolder, in that it would be misguided to conceptualize the issue in terms of theories (isolated from any scientific aims and standards) being accepted given the evidential basis. From my perspective, a scientific theory is a tool developed by us for certain intellectual and practical purposes, so that a scientific account has always to be viewed together with the purpose for which it is used. Scientists recognize that models are not all-purpose tools and that different models are required for different epistemic purposes (where some epistemic purposes can even make reality-distorting idealizations legitimate). The same holds when the purpose includes social considerations; and there is nothing wrong about a particular theory being adequate for one human purpose but not being adequate for another purpose. My perspective involves a broad construal of theory 'acceptance,' which in line with a good deal of scientific practice is not just the passive belief in individual propositions, but the active scientific development and use of theories (for a certain purpose). 21 In addition to using a scientific model for some aim specific of a research group, this includes the communication of an overall scientific account to the public-which is by no means an insignificant aspect of science, as scientists' push for being able to speak about their findings without government censorship in the case of Canada's 'death of evidence' issue reminds us.
These considerations show that my account of the role of social values cannot be captured by a framework that exclusively conceptualizes theory acceptance in terms of making inferences from evidence. The broader philosophical framework that is needed for any discussion of values in science (though it can already be found in other philosophical contexts)
includes that an important aspect of scientists' acceptance and use of theories are conditions of adequacy, which are concrete, domain-specific standards of what it means for a particular scientific theory to be significant, explanatory, unbiased, complete, or practically applicable.
Such standards are based on the epistemic, social and/or environmental purpose for which a scientific theory has been developed and is being used. While such purposes are also germane to the issue of choosing research questions and methodologies for developing scientific accounts, they cannot be neglected in context of theory acceptance. In fact, the purpose for which a theory is to be used and the underlying values have an overarching impact on various aspects of research. Moreover, in contrast to clearly problematic instances of politicized science, my account likewise does not permit scientists to distort evidence or to ignore relevant evidence, and a scientific theory has to reflect reality. For instance, the adequacy condition that an account of human evolution include the contribution of women does not mean that one may prefer a fictional account over a veridical account because the former would be less sexist. Instead, historical contributions of women are to be included to the extent to which there is evidence for them, and the kind of contributions actually made are to be captured no matter how similar or dissimilar they are to the contributions of men. 22 I do not endorse politicized science in that evidence matters to my account of theory acceptance. Still, conforming to evidence is not the only consideration in theory acceptance. For amongst the various representations of some aspects of reality, scientists choose one that suits their particular aims and standards, which often are certain explanatory aims and standards of explanatory adequacy, but can also include social and environmental aims that call for the theory to include relevant features of reality. Scientific models and theories are tools for us that also answer to our intellectual and practical purposes.
Given this, just like 'a theory is to be accepted solely because it aligns with the evidential basis' in contrast to 'a theory can be accepted solely because it aligns with one's scientific or social agenda' is a false dichotomy, I reject the opposition that Douglas views between aiming at understanding about the world and aiming at understanding that suits one's interests:
the purpose of pursuing empirical knowledge … is to gain knowledge about the world, not to gain an understanding that suits one's preference. (Douglas 2009, 122) In his discussion prompted by the 'death of evidence' issue in Canada, Stathis Psillos Eichler's (1988, ch. 7) classical guide on non-sexist methods in social science research addresses problems with concepts and the formation of appropriate ones in detail. Anderson (1995, 45-49) discusses problematic economic definitions of 'employment rate' (which when excluding part-time work can fail to address the social situation of women) and psychological categorizations of personality characteristics (which may assume that certain 'masculine' behaviours and preferences are thereby not 'feminine'). 
Notes on contributor
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36 16 Sometimes inductive risk accounts are in fact presented as if it was solely about the amount of evidence, rather than also about the kind of evidence needed: 'deciding how much evidence is enough to support making an empirical claim,' 'requiring more evidence when such consequences are dire,' 'more evidence arises that reduces uncertainty in the choice' (Douglas 2009, 80, 97 & 107) ; 'deciding how much evidence to demand when accepting a scientific hypothesis,' 'how much evidence is required for theory acceptance' (Elliott 2011b, 66 & 68; in It is less clear, though, how a methodology and especially a practice of gathering data could be an empirical claim with a truth-value, so that her inductive risk approach in terms of the uncertainty of empirical claims and the consequences of endorsing a false empirical claim could gain traction.
But it actually does not matter whether the way in which values guide the proper gathering of evidence is seen as part of inductive risk or as a separate role for values (orthogonal to inductive risk as pertaining to the evidence-theory relation), given that beyond the focus on the evidential basis my framework to be developed will in any case be broader by pointing to the intended theory and the aims of developing a particular theory. In this fashion my approach will go beyond many accounts of the role of values, not just inductive risk accounts.
17 Longino (2013) discusses how different approaches (and fields) investigating human aggression and sexuality partition the causal space differently, which also results in different implicit assumptions about what an adequate explanation looks like. Likwornik (2015) also highlights the impact of opaque (implicit) values on the scientific process.
18 One cannot exclude that there can be different justifications for the same set of adequacy conditions.
Even if the adequacy conditions of a primatological theory could be articulated involving social values but also based on purely epistemic considerations, my position would still be that deeming social values to be irrelevant given the availability of a purely epistemic justification is an illicit preference for one way of justifying conditions of adequacy. My own approach is to view both epistemic and social values as making a fruitful contribution and to employ them in a joint fashion when articulating adequacy conditions.
19 'When I pointed out that the vast majority of female stumptail orgasms occurred during sex among the females alone, [the primatologist studying only female orgasms occurring in male-female sex]
Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories 37 replied that yes, he knew that, but he was only interested in the important orgasms.' (Lloyd 1993, 142) 20 Likwornik (2015) discusses other aspects of the entwinement of empirical claims and values. 21 The aims underlying the formation and use of scientific representations, in particular quantitative models, have been addressed by philosophical accounts of model-based science (Potochnik 2012;  see also Brigandt 2013; Giere 2006; van Fraassen 2008 Kourany's (2010) example of a study on domestic violence in black communities, which faced the dual challenge of exhibiting problems encountered specifically by black women without perpetuating the racist stereotype that black men are inherently more violent. Similar to me, Kourany argues that research that attempts to avoid racism is still committed to evidence. All such a research program requires 'is that dissimilarities in domestic violence within the black and white communities be explained, as far as empirically possible, in terms of social differences such as racism and poverty. The program does not guarantee that any of these explanations will be successful' (72).
23 Psillos (2015) views those social values as legitimate for use in science that can be universalised, making reference to feminist standpoint epistemologies and Marxist theories of social emancipation, e.g., the idea that the interests of the proletariat are 'universal' interests in the sense that everyone would benefit from them. Viewing this as too restrictive given that not all relevant values are universalisable, Goldenberg (2015) adopts the alternative approach of an empirical justification of (legitimate) values, in line with feminist empiricism.
